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Abstract
We document that job polarization – contrary to the consensus – has started
as early as the 1950s in the US: middle-wage workers have been losing both in
terms of employment and average wage growth compared to low- and high-wage
workers. Given that polarization is a long-run phenomenon and closely linked to
the shift from manufacturing to services, we propose a structural change driven
explanation, where we explicitly model the sectoral choice of workers. Our sim-
ple model does remarkably well not only in matching the evolution of sectoral
employment, but also of relative wages over the past fifty years.
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1 Introduction
The polarization of the labor market is a widely documented phenomenon in the US
and several European countries since the 1980s.1 This phenomenon, besides the rel-
ative growth of wages and employment of high-wage occupations, also entails the
relative growth of wages and employment of low-wage occupations compared to
middle-wage occupations. The leading explanation for polarization is the routiniza-
tion hypothesis, which relies on the assumption that information and computer tech-
nologies (ICT) substitute for middle-skill and hence middle-wage (routine) occupa-
tions, whereas they complement the high-skilled and high-wage (abstract) occupa-
tions (Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006), Autor and
Dorn (2013), Feng and Graetz (2014), Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014), Michaels,
Natraj, and Van Reenen (2014)).
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we document a set of facts which
raise flags that routinization, although certainly playing a role from the 1980s onwards,
might not be the only driving force behind this phenomenon. Second, based on these
facts we propose a novel perspective on the polarization of the labor market, one based
on structural change.
Our analysis of US data for the period 1950-2007 reveals some novel facts.2 First,
we document that polarization defined over occupational categories both in terms of
employment and wages has been present in the US since the 1950s, which is long be-
fore ICT could have played a role. Second, we show that at least since the 1960s the
same patterns for both employment and wages are discernible in terms of three broad
sectors: low-skilled services, manufacturing and high-skilled services. Additionally,
confirming previous findings, that a significant part of the observed occupational em-
ployment share changes are driven by sectoral employment shifts; thus understanding
the sectoral labor market trends is important even for the occupational trends.
Based on these facts, we propose a structural change driven explanation for these
1See for example Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) and Autor and Dorn (2013) for the US, Goos
and Manning (2007) for the UK, Spitz-Oener (2006) and Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Scho¨nberg (2009) for
Germany, Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2009, 2014) for Europe.
2Analyzing the data until more recent years does not affect our findings; we chose 2007 as the final
year to exclude the potential impact of the financial crisis.
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sectoral labor market trends. We introduce a Roy-type selection mechanism into a
multi-sector growth model, where each sector values a specific skill. Individuals, who
are heterogeneous along a range of skills, optimally select which sector to work in.
As long as the goods produced by the different sectors are complements, a change in
relative productivities increases labor demand in the relatively slow growing sectors,
and wages in these sectors have to increase in order to attract more workers.
In particular we assume that there are three types of consumption goods: low-end
service, manufacturing and high-end service goods.3 We break services into two as
they comprise of many different subsets, e.g. dry cleaners vs. banking, which seem
hardly to be perfect substitutes in consumption, as would be implied by having a
single service consumption in households’ preferences. In our model, we therefore
treat low- and high-end services as being just as substitutable with each other as they
are with manufacturing goods.
A change in relative productivities does not only affect relative supply, but through
prices it also affects relative demand. Given that goods and the two types of services
are complements, as relative labor productivity in manufacturing increases, labor has
to reallocate from manufacturing to both service sectors. To attract more workers into
both low- and high-skilled services, their wages have to improve relative to manufac-
turing. Since in the data we see that manufacturing jobs tend to be in the middle of the
wage distribution, this mechanism leads to a pattern of polarization, which is driven
by the interaction of supply and demand for sectoral output.
We calibrate the model to quantitatively assess the contribution of structural change
– driven by unbalanced technological progress – to the polarization of wages and em-
ployment. Taking labor productivity growth from the data and using existing esti-
mates for the elasticity of substitution between sectors, we find that our model pre-
dicts more than 70 per cent of the relative average wage gain of high- and low-skilled
services compared to manufacturing, and around three quarters of the change in em-
ployment shares.
3Buera and Kaboski (2012) also split services into low- and high-skilled: their selection is based on
the fraction of college educated workers in the industry. Their main interest is linking the rising skill
premium to the increasing share of services in value added, and they emphasize the home vs market
production margin. Our focus is very different: sectoral wages.
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This paper builds on and contributes to the literature both on polarization and
on structural change. To our knowledge, these two phenomena until now have been
studied separately.4 However, according to our analysis of the data, polarization of
the labor market and structural change are closely linked to each other, and according
to our model, industrial shifts can lead to polarization.
The structural change literature has documented for several countries that as in-
come increases employment shifts away from agriculture and from manufacturing to-
wards services, and expenditure shares follow similar patterns (Kuznets (1957), Mad-
dison (1980), Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2014)). In particular the employ-
ment and expenditure share of manufacturing has been declining since the 1950/60s
in the US, while those in services have been increasing. From an empirical perspec-
tive, we add to this literature by documenting that in the US the employment patterns
are mimicked by the path of relative average wages. The economic mechanisms put
forward in the literature for structural transformation are related to either preferences
or technology. The preference explanation relies on non-homothetic preferences, such
that changes in aggregate income lead to a reallocation of employment across sectors
(Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001), Boppart (2014)). The mechanisms related to tech-
nology rely either on differential total factor productivity (TFP) growth across sectors
(Ngai and Pissarides (2007)) or on changes in the supply of an input used by different
sectors with different intensities (Caselli and Coleman (2001), Acemoglu and Guerrieri
(2008)).
We build on the model of Ngai and Pissarides (2007) closely, with one important
modification: we explicitly model sectoral labor supply. As our goal is to study the
joint evolution of employment and wages, we introduce heterogeneity in workers’
skills, who endogenously sort into different sectors. In order to meet increasing labor
demands in certain sectors – driven by structural change – the relative wages of those
sectors have to increase. Since we model the sector of work choice, we can analyze the
effects of structural change on relative sectoral wages, which is not common in models
4Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Goos et al. (2014) look at the contribution of between-industry
shifts to the polarization of occupational employment, but do not analyze the effect of structural change
on the polarization of the labor market.
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of structural change.5 Another modification of Ngai and Pissarides (2007) is that we do
not model capital, as our interest is in the heterogeneity of labor supply. The change in
relative sectoral labor productivity can be driven by differential sectoral TFP changes
or by capital accumulation and different sectoral capital intensities.6 We stay agnostic
about the origin of the differential labor productivity growth across sectors, and as
Goos et al. (2014) point out it is possible that part of this since the 1980s or 1990s is
driven by different routine intensities and ICT.
Ours is not the first paper to consider sectoral choice in a model of structural
change. The setup of Matsuyama (1991) is similar, where agents have different ef-
ficiencies across sectors, but focuses on the theoretical possibility of multiplicity of
stationary steady states. Caselli and Coleman (2001) study the role of falling costs of
education in the structural shift from agriculture to manufacturing, and they derive
predictions about the relative wages in the farm and non-farm sector. Focusing on
cross-country differences, Lagakos and Waugh (2013) show that self-selection can ac-
count for gaps in productivity and wages between agriculture and non-agriculture.
Buera and Kaboski (2012) analyze the relation between the increasing value added
share of the service sector and the increasing skill premium, without exploring their
model’s implications for sectoral employment or wages, whereas this is the focus of
our paper.
The polarization literature typically focuses on employment and wage patterns af-
ter the 1980s or 1990s. We contribute to this literature by documenting that in the US
the polarization of occupations in terms of wages and employment has started as early
as the 1950s. As mentioned before, the leading explanation is routinization linked to
ICT. While the spread of ICT is a convincing explanation for the polarization of la-
bor markets after the mid-1980s, it does not provide an explanation for the patterns
observed earlier.7 Another explanation suggested in the literature are consumption
5A notable exception is Caselli and Coleman (2001).
6For example if ICT is used more intensively in the manufacturing sector, and ICT becomes cheaper,
then this would show up as an increase in the relative productivity of manufacturing workers.
7Another explanation is the increasing off-shorability of tasks (rather than finished goods), as first
emphasized by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). It has been argued that it is largely the middle-
earning jobs that are off-shorable, but the evidence is mixed (Blinder (2009), Blinder and Krueger (2013),
Acemoglu and Autor (2011)). Just as for the routinization hypothesis, this mechanism could have ex-
planatory power from the 1980s onwards.
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spillovers. This argument suggests that as the income of high-earners increases, their
demand for low-skilled service jobs increases as well, leading to a spillover to the
lower end of the wage distribution (Manning (2004), Mazzolari and Ragusa (2013)).
We do not incorporate such a mechanism in our model, as we strive for the most par-
simonious setup featuring structural change, which does a good job in replicating the
basic sectoral labor market facts since the 1960s.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 lays out our empirical
findings, section 3 our theoretical model, section 4 the quantitative results, and section
5 concludes.
2 Polarization in the data
Using US Census data between 1950 and 2000 and the 2007 American Community Sur-
vey (ACS), we document the following three facts: 1) polarization in terms of occupa-
tions started as early as the 1950/60s, 2) wages and employment have been polarizing
in terms of broadly defined industries as well, 3) a significant part of employment po-
larization in terms of occupations is driven by employment shifts across industries.
The focus of our quantitative model is fact 2). We document fact 1) as most of the lit-
erature documents polarization in terms of occupations. Fact 3) has been documented
in the literature (Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Goos et al. (2014)), here we confirm it
for our classification, data, and time horizon. We show fact 3) to convince the reader
whose main interest is in occupations, that for the full picture one needs to consider
industries as well. In what follows we document each of these facts in detail.
2.1 Polarization in terms of occupations
In the empirical literature, polarization is mostly represented in terms of occupations.
We document polarization in terms of two occupational classifications: we start from
the finest balanced occupational codes possible, and then go to ten broad occupational
categories.
Following the methodology used in Autor et al. (2006), Acemoglu and Autor (2011),
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Figure 1: Smoothed changes in wages and employment
Notes: The data is taken from IPUMS US Census data for 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and the
American Community Survey (ACS) for 2007. The sample excludes agricultural occupations/industries
and observations with missing wage data; the details are given in the appendix. Balanced occupation
categories (183 of them) were defined by the authors based on Meyer and Osborne (2005), Dorn (2009)
and Autor and Dorn (2013). The horizontal axis contains occupational skill percentiles based on their
1980 mean wages (see appendix for details). In the left panel the vertical axis shows for each occupa-
tional skill percentile the 30-year change in log hourly real wages, whereas in the right panel it shows
the 30-year change in employment shares (calculated as hours supplied).
and Autor and Dorn (2013), we plot the smoothed changes in log real wages and em-
ployment shares for occupational percentiles, where occupations are ranked accord-
ing to their 1980 mean hourly wages.8 The novelty in these graphs is that we show
these patterns going back until 1950, rather than focusing only on the post-1980 pe-
riod.9 In both graphs, each of the four curves represent changes which occurred over
a different 30-year period. The left panel in Figure 1 shows that there has been po-
larization in terms of real wages in all 30-year periods, since the real wage change is
larger for low- and for high-ranked occupations than it is for middle-ranked occupa-
tions. The polarization of real wages is most pronounced in the first two 30-year inter-
vals, but it is clearly discernible in the following ones as well from the slight U-shape
of the smoothed changes. The right panel shows the smoothed employment share
changes. The picture shows that employment did not move monotonically towards
higher wage occupations, instead it seems that middle-earning occupations lost the
8We split occupations into 100 groups, each representing 1 percent of employment in 1980. We
smooth changes in log real hourly wages and employment shares with a locally weighted regression
using a bandwidth of 0.8.
9For comparability with the literature, we rank occupations based on their mean hourly wage in
1980. However, given that we look at a longer horizon than most of the literature, we also plot these
changes against a different ranking of occupations, one based on the 1950 mean hourly real wages. The
patterns look the same, see Figure 10 and the discussion in the appendix.
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most in terms of employment. Thus employment polarization is present in the sense
that the employment share in low- and high-wage occupations increased more (or de-
creased less) than in middle-wage occupations. This polarization is most pronounced
in the last 30 years (1980-2007), but it seems to be present even in the earlier periods.10
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Figure 2: Polarization in broad occupational categories
Notes: These graphs plot for 10 occupational categories the 30-year change in the occupation’s median
log wage (left panels) and in its employment share (right panels) against its median log wage in 1980.
The size of the circles represents the occupation’s employment share in the initial year. The top panels
show the changes between 1950 and 1980, whereas the bottom panels show the changes between 1980-
2007. The 10 occupational categories are: 1 personal care, 2 food and cleaning services, 3 protective
services, 4 operators, fabricators and laborers, 5 production, construction trades, extractive and preci-
sion production, 6 administrative and support occupations, 7 sales, 8 technicians and related support
occupations, 9 professional specialty occupations, 10 managers.
A set of balanced occupational categories is needed to generate Figure 1. We aggre-
gate up occupations based on Meyer and Osborne (2005), Dorn (2009) and Autor and
Dorn (2013) to achieve the finest possible yet balanced set of categories. A potential
worry is that between 1950 and 2007 the Census Bureau has changed the occupation
codes which serve as basis for our categories. To be sure that the changes conducted
10When ranking occupations in terms of the 1950, i.e. the initial, wage distribution, as is commonly
done in this literature, employment polarization is much more noticeable since the 1960s, see Figure 10
in the appendix.
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by the Census Bureau are not confounding our results, we present these trends for a
coarser set of occupations, where there are no doubts that the categories are consistent
over time.
Similarly to Goos and Manning (2007) and Goos et al. (2009), Figure 2 shows for
10 occupational groups the change in each occupation’s median log wage (left panels)
and in its employment share (right panels) against its median log wage in 1980. The
panels on the top show the change between 1950-1980 and the panels on the bottom
over 1980-2007. The size of the marker in the scatter plot corresponds to the employ-
ment share of the occupation in the initial year. The plots also show two nonlinear fits:
the solid line is an epanechnikov kernel and the dashed line is a second order frac-
tional polynomial. The U-shape displayed in the plots confirms polarization of real
wages and employment, both for the 1950-1980 and the 1980-2007 period. 11
2.2 Polarization in terms of sectors
Next we document the polarization of employment and wages in terms of three broad
industries or sectors: low-skilled services, manufacturing, and high-skilled services.
Our classification for the manufacturing sector includes also mining and construc-
tion, as is common in the structural change literature (e.g. Herrendorf, Rogerson, and
Valentinyi (2013)). As mentioned in the introduction, we split the remaining (service)
industries into two categories, where within sectors the industries should be close
substitutes, whereas across sectors they should be complements. Our classification
is also guided by production side considerations; in low-end services person-specific
skills matter less than in high-end services. As a result of the combined production
and consumption side considerations we classify as low-end services the following in-
dustries: personal services, entertainment, low-skilled transport, low-skilled business
and repair services, retail trade, and wholesale trade. High-end services comprise of
professional and related services, finance, insurance and real estate, communications,
11In Figure 12 in the appendix, we document polarization in terms of occupations in an even coarser
classification. Following Acemoglu and Autor (2011) we classify occupation groups into three cate-
gories: manual, routine, and abstract. Again, we find that the middle earning group, the routine work-
ers, lost both in terms of relative average wage and employment share to the benefit of manual and
abstract workers.
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high-skilled business services, communications, utilities, high-skilled transport, and
public administration. We see in the data a very large difference in low- and high-
end service worker characteristics: in particular low-end service workers have lower
hourly wages on average and have much less education; for this reason we refer to
this sector as low-skilled services.12
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Figure 3: Polarization for broad industries
Notes: The data used is the same as in Figure 1. Each worker is classified into one of three sectors based
on their industry code (for details of the industry classification see text and the appendix). The left
panel shows relative wages: the high-skilled service and the low-skilled service premium compared to
manufacturing (and their 95% confidence intervals), implied by the regression of log wages on gender,
race, a polynomial in potential experience, and sector dummies. The right panel shows employment
shares, calculated in terms of hours worked. The dashed vertical line represents 1960, from when on
manufacturing employment has been contracting.
Figure 3 documents the patterns of polarization both in terms of employment shares
and wages for the above defined sectors between 1950/1960 and 2007. The right panel
shows the path of employment shares: high-skilled services increase continuously,
low-skilled services increase and manufacturing decreases from 1960 onwards.13 In
terms of wages, we plot the sector premium in high-skilled and low-skilled services
compared to manufacturing, as well as their 95 percent confidence intervals. These
sector premia are the exponents of the coefficients on sector dummies, which come
from a regression of log wages where we control also for gender, race, and a polyno-
mial in potential experience.14 We plot these rather than the relative average wages,
because in our quantitative exercise we do not aim to explain sectoral wage differen-
12See Figure 3, and Figure 13 and Table 4 in the appendix.
13Between 1950 and 1960 manufacturing employment increased, and low-skilled services dropped.
14See Table 5 in the appendix for details of the regressions. The patterns of relative average wages
for industries are very similar, see Figure 13 in the appendix.
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tials that are potentially caused by age, gender or racial composition differences and
the differential path of these across sectors.15 As the graph shows, low-skilled service
workers earn less, whereas high-skilled service workers earn more than manufactur-
ing workers. Since the 1960s both low- and high-skilled service workers have been
gaining in terms of wages compared to manufacturing workers. To summarize, from
1960 onwards there is clear polarization in terms of these three sectors: the low- and
high-earners gained in terms of employment and wages at the expense of the middle-
earning, manufacturing workers.
2.3 Polarization across occupations linked to industry shifts
To quantify the contribution of sectoral employment shifts to each occupation’s em-
ployment share path, we conduct a standard shift-share decomposition.16 The over-
all change in the employment share of occupation o between year 0 and t, ∆Eot =
Eot − Eo0, can be expressed as:
∆Eot =
∑
i
λoi∆Eit︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡∆EBot
+
∑
i
∆λoitEi︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡∆EWot
,
where λoit = Loit/Lit denotes the share of occupation o, industry i employment within
industry i employment at time t, and Eit = Lit/Lt denotes the share of industry i
employment within total employment at time t. ∆EBo represents the change in the
employment share of occupation o that is attributable to changes in industrial com-
position, i.e. structural transformation, while ∆EWo reflects changes driven by within
sector forces.17
15One might be concerned that the employment share changes are driven by changes in the age,
gender, race composition of the labor force. To assess this, we generate counterfactual industry em-
ployment shares by fixing the industry employment share of each age-gender-race cell at its 1960 level,
and allowing the employment shares of the cells to change. This exercise confirms that to a large ex-
tent the employment share changes are not driven by the compositional changes of the labor force. See
Figure 14 in the appendix.
16An alternative way is to calculate how much occupational employment shares would have
changed, if industry employment shares would have remained at their 1960 level. See Figure 15 in
the appendix.
17The change driven by shifts between sectors is calculated as the weighted sum of the change in
sector i’s employment share, ∆Eit, where the weights are the average share of occupation o within
sector i, λoi = (λoit + λoi0)/2. The change driven by shifts within sectors is calculated as the weighted
11
Table 1: Decomposition of changes in occupational employment shares
Employment shares
3 x 3 10 x 13
1950-2007 1960-2007 1950-2007 1960-2007
Manual
Total ∆ 2.98 5.68 3.12 6.41
Between ∆ 2.30 3.07 4.30 5.92
Within ∆ 0.67 2.61 -1.18 0.49
Routine
Total ∆ -19.79 -19.14 -25.80 -24.26
Between ∆ -5.66 -6.32 -12.22 -13.06
Within ∆ -14.13 -12.82 -13.58 -11.20
Abstract
Total ∆ 16.81 13.46 19.79 16.02
Between ∆ 3.35 3.24 8.72 7.53
Within ∆ 13.46 10.21 11.07 8.49
Average
Total ∆ -7.05 -6.90 -2.00 -1.85
Between ∆ -2.17 -2.44 -0.86 -0.98
Within ∆ -4.89 -4.46 -1.14 -0.87
Notes: Same data as in Figure 1. For each occupational category, the first row presents the total change,
the second the between-industry component, and the third the within-industry component over the
period 1950-2007 and over 1960-2007. The first two columns use 3 occupations and 3 sectors, columns
three and four 10 occupations and 13 industries.
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Table 1 shows the occupational employment share changes and their decomposi-
tion between 1950 and 2007, and alternatively between 1960 and 2007, into a between-
industry and a within-industry component. We show these changes for three broad oc-
cupational categories commonly used in the routinization literature. This Table shows
that there has been polarization: employment has been shifting from routine to both
manual and abstract jobs (also documented in Figure 12 in the appendix). In terms
of average occupational employment share changes over this period, between 35 per
cent and 53 per cent of the changes are driven by between-industry shifts, depending
on whether we use a finer or a coarser categorization of occupations and industries.
Between-industry shifts matter the most for manual occupations and the least for ab-
stract occupations, where they still account for at least one fifth. The first two columns
use the three occupation categories (manual, routine, abstract) and the three sectors
(low-skilled services, manufacturing, high-skilled services) defined earlier. To be sure
that our results are not driven by the coarse categorization, similarly to Acemoglu and
Autor (2011), we implement this decomposition also in terms of finer categories, 10
occupations and 13 industry groups, shown in the last two columns.18
This decomposition indicates that a significant part of the occupational employ-
ment share changes are driven by shifts in the industrial composition of the economy
between 1950 and 2007. The shift-share decomposition conducted here is very simi-
lar to that in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Goos et al. (2014), however, it is done
for our classification of industries and occupations, our sample period and data. Both
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Goos et al. (2014) found a similar magnitude for the
role of between-industry shifts.19 Our reading of these results is that in order to un-
sum of the change in occupation o’s share within sector i employment, ∆λoit, where the weights are the
average employment share of sector i, Ei = (Eit + Ei0)/2.
18The 10 occupations are the same as in Figure 2, while the 13 industries are: 1 personal services
and entertainment, 2 low-skilled transport, 3 low-skilled business and service repairs, 4 retail trade, 5
wholesale trade, 6 extractive industries, 7 construction, 8 manufacturing, 9 professional and related ser-
vices, 10 finance, insurance, and real estate, 11 high-skilled business services, 12 high-skilled transport
and public utilities (incl. communications), 13 public administration.
19Acemoglu and Autor (2011) use US Census data between 1960 and 2000, and the ACS 2008 data
to decompose occupational employment share changes. They aggregate their findings to four occupa-
tion categories (abstract, routine cognitive, routine non-cognitive, manual) and conduct the shift-share
decomposition for men and women separately. Their focus is the declining importance of between-
industry shifts from 1960-1980 to 1980-2007. We find some support for this in our decade-by-decade
analysis shown in Table 7 in the appendix. The relatively smaller contribution of between-industry
13
derstand the occupational employment share changes it is important to consider the
forces that drive the structural shift of employment away from manufacturing and
towards both types of services.
To summarize, we show two new facts and an additional one about the occu-
pational and sectoral employment shares and relative wages. We documented that
polarization defined over occupational categories both in terms of employment and
wages has been present in the US since the 1950s. Second we showed that the same
patterns are discernible in terms of three broad sectors: low-skilled services, manufac-
turing and high-skilled services. Finally, we showed that a significant amount of the
employment share changes in occupations is driven by the employment shifts across
industries.
In the rest of the paper we present a simple model of sorting and structural change
to jointly explain the sectoral shifts in employment and the changes in average sectoral
wages. We then calibrate the model to quantitatively assess how much of the polar-
ization of sectoral employment and wages it can explain over the last fifty years, when
feeding in sectoral labor productivity from the data.
3 Model
In order to illustrate the mechanism that is driving the polarization of wages and em-
ployment, we present a parsimonious static model, and analyze its behavior as pro-
ductivity levels increase across sectors. The key novel feature of our model is that
we assume that each sector values different skills in its production process. Relax-
ing the assumption of the homogeneity of labor allows us to derive predictions, not
only about the labor and expenditure shares, but also about the relative average wages
shifts in later periods might be due to routinization kicking in after the 1980s, thus providing an extra
force for within-industry reallocation of labor. Nonetheless, we find that even in the 1980-2007 period,
between-industry shifts explain a significant part of occupational employment share changes. Goos
et al. (2014) use data for 16 European countries between 1993 and 2010, and attribute a roughly equal
role to between and within industry shifts in all occupations. They argue that part of the between-
industry shifts can be driven by routinization, which is a within-industry phenomenon. Since rou-
tinization has a bigger impact on industries where routine labor is used more intensively, employment
might shift away from these industries. However, routinization, linked to ICT, is not likely to be driving
the faster productivity growth observed between the 1950s and 1980s.
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across sectors over time.
We assume that the economy is populated by heterogeneous agents, who all make
individually optimal decisions about their sector of work. Every individual chooses
their sector of work to maximize wages, in a Roy-model type setup. We assume that in
low-skilled services everyone is equally productive, as everyone uses the one unit of
raw labor that they have. On the other hand, we assume that individuals are ex ante
heterogeneous in their efficiency units of labor in manufacturing and in high-skilled
services, and thus endogenously sort into the sector where the return to their labor is
the highest.
Furthermore these individuals are organized into a stand-in household, which
maximizes its utility subject to its budget constraint.20 Households derive utility from
consuming high- and low-skilled services and manufacturing goods.
The economy is in a decentralized equilibrium at all times: individuals make sec-
toral choices to maximize their wages, the stand-in household collects all wages and
maximizes its utility by optimally allocating this income between low-skilled services,
manufacturing goods and high-skilled services. Production is perfectly competitive,
wages and prices are such that all markets clear. We analyze the qualitative and quan-
titative role of technological progress in explaining the observed wage and employ-
ment dynamics since the 1960s.
3.1 Sectors and production
There are three sectors in the model: high-skilled services (S), manufacturing (M ), and
low-skilled services (L). All goods and services are produced in perfect competition,
and each sector uses only labor as an input into production.
The technology to produce high-skilled services is:
Ys = AsNs, (1)
20We make the assumption of a stand-in household purely for expositional purposes. Given that
the preferences we use are homothetic, the resulting sectoral demands are equal to the aggregation of
individual demands.
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where As is productivity and Ns is the total amount of efficiency units of labor (effi-
ciency labor for short) hired in sector S for production. Sector S firms are price takers,
therefore the equilibrium wage per efficiency unit of labor (unit wage for short) in this
sector has to satisfy:
ωs =
∂psYs
∂Ns
= psAs. (2)
The technology to produce manufacturing goods is:
Ym = AmNm, (3)
where Am is productivity, Nm is the total amount of efficiency units of labor hired
in sector M . Since sector M firms are also price takers, the equilibrium wage per
efficiency unit of labor in sector M has to satisfy:
ωm =
∂pmYm
∂Nm
= pmAm. (4)
Note that the wage of a worker with a efficiency units of sector i labor when working
in sector i ∈ {M,S} is ωia.
We assume that each worker is equally talented in providing low-skilled services, i.e.
efficiency units of labor do not matter here. The total amount of low-skilled services
provided is:
Yl = AlLl, (5)
where Al is productivity, and Ll is the total amount of raw units of labor (raw labor
for short) working in the low-skilled service sector. Since sector L firms are also price
takers, the equilibrium wage per unit of raw labor in sector L has to satisfy:
ωl =
∂plYl
∂Ll
= plAl. (6)
Note that since everyone has the same amount of raw labor, everyone working in the
low-skilled service sector earns the same wage.
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3.2 Labor supply and demand for goods
The stand-in household consists of a measure one continuum of different types of
members. Each member chooses which one of the three market sectors to supply his
one unit of raw labor in. The household collects the wages of all its members and de-
cides how much low-skilled services, manufacturing goods and high-skilled services
to buy on the market.
3.2.1 Sector of work
We assume that every member of the household works full time in one of the three
market sectors. Since every member can work in any of the three sectors, and each
member’s utility is increasing in his own wages (as well as in all other members’
wages), it is optimal for each worker to choose the sector which provides him with
the highest wages.
Individuals are heterogeneous in their endowment of efficiency units of labor, a ∈
R2+, which is drawn from a time invariant distribution f(a). For simplicity we assume
that each dimension of ability corresponds to one sector, such that am ≡ a(1) denotes
the individual’s efficiency units of labor in manufacturing, while as ≡ a(2) denotes
his efficiency units in high-skilled services.21 As we assume that low-skilled services
only requires an individual’s raw labor, each individual is equally productive when
working in L. Therefore the wage of an individual with a = (am, as) efficiency units of
labor in sector L is ωl, in sector M is amωm, while if working in sector S it is asωs.
Given wage rates ωl, ωm, ωs – per unit of labor in sector L and per efficiency unit in
M and S – the optimal decision of any agent can be characterized as follows.
Result 1. Given unit wage rates ωl, ωm and ωs, the optimal sector choice of individuals can be
21The results of the model are qualitatively unchanged if we assume that an individual has αma(1)+
(1−αm)a(2) efficiency units of labor in manufacturing, while he has αsa(1)+(1−αs)a(2) in high-skilled
services, as long as αm 6= αs.
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characterized by two cutoff values:
âm ≡ ωl
ωm
, (7)
âs ≡ ωl
ωs
. (8)
It is optimal for an individual with (am, as) efficiency units of labor to work in sector L if and
only if
am ≤ âm and as ≤ âs. (9)
It is optimal for the individual to work in sector M if and only if
am ≥ âm and as ≤ âs
âm
am. (10)
Finally it is optimal to work in sector S if and only if
as ≥ âs and am ≤ âm
âs
as (11)
S
M
L
âm
âs
âs
âm
am
am
as
Figure 4: Optimal sector of work
The figure depicts the optimal sector of work choices as a function of âm = ωl/ωm and âs = ωl/ωs.
The blue dotted area shows the efficiency unit pairs (am, as) where L is the optimal sector, the red
vertically striped area shows where M is optimal, and the green horizontally striped area shows where
S is optimal.
Figure 4 shows this endogenous sorting behavior. Individuals who have low effi-
ciency units in both manufacturing and high-skilled services sort into low-skilled ser-
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vices (the blue dotted area). Individuals with high enough manufacturing efficiency
and relative to this a low high-skilled service efficiency sort into manufacturing jobs
(the red vertically striped area). Individuals who have a high enough high-skilled ser-
vice efficiency and relative to this a low manufacturing efficiency choose to work in
high-skilled services (the green horizontally striped area).
It is worth to consider the optimal sorting patterns as a function of relative unit
wages. A ceteris paribus fall in the sector M unit wage, ωm, makes working in sec-
tor M less attractive both compared to working in sector L and S. In the graph this
change would be represented by an outward shift in âm = ωl/ωm, and a flattening of
amâs/âm = amωm/ωs; sector M is squeezed from both sides. A ceteris paribus fall in
the sector S unit wage, ωs, has similar effects. In the graph âs = ωl/ωs would shift
up, as sector L becomes more attractive, and amâs/âm would become steeper as sec-
tor M becomes more attractive; sector S loses from both sides. A fall in sector L unit
wage, ωl, holding everything else constant, makes sector L less attractive. This would
be captured in the graph by an inward shift of âm = ωl/ωm and a downward shift of
âs = ωl/ωs, leaving amâs/âm unchanged; both sector M and S become more attractive
compared to sector L.
The optimal sector of work choices of individuals determine the effective labor
supplies in the three markets:
Ll(âm, âs) =
∫ âm
0
∫ âs
0
f(am, as)dasdam, (12)
Nm(âm, âs) =
∫ ∞
âm
∫ âs
âm
am
0
amf(am, as)dasdam, (13)
Ns(âm, âs) =
∫ ∞
âs
∫ âm
âs
as
0
asf(am, as)damdas. (14)
Note that in sector M and S these are the effective labor supplies, the raw labor sup-
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plies – or employment shares22 – in these sectors are:
Lm(âm, âs) =
∫ ∞
âm
∫ âs
âm
am
0
f(am, as)dasdam, (15)
Ls(âm, âs) =
∫ ∞
âs
∫ âm
âs
as
0
f(am, as)damdas. (16)
Note that ωl, ωm, ωs are the sectoral unit wages, and we are also interested in the
sectoral average wages. These simply are the total earnings in a sector divided by the
mass of people working in the sector:
wl =
∫ âm
0
∫ âs
0
ωlf(am, as)dasdam
Ll
= ωl, (17)
wm =
∫∞
âm
∫ âs
âm
am
0 ωmamf(am, as)dasdam
Lm
= ωm
Nm
Lm
, (18)
ws =
∫∞
âs
∫ âm
âs
as
0 ωsasf(am, as)damdas
Ls
= ωs
Ns
Ls
. (19)
3.2.2 Demand for consumption goods and services
Household members derive utility from low-skilled services, manufacturing goods
and high-skilled services. The household allocates total income earned by household
members to maximize the following utility:
max
Cl,Cm,Cs
u
([
θlC
ε−1
ε
l + θmC
ε−1
ε
m + θsC
ε−1
ε
s
] ε
ε−1
)
s.t. plCl + pmCm + psCs ≤ ωlLl + ωmNm + ωsNs
where u is any monotone increasing function, ωlLl + ωmNm + ωsNs are the total wages
of household members, pl, pm, and ps are the prices of the low-skilled services, the
manufacturing goods, and the high-skilled services.
22The empirical counterpart of these raw labor supplies, Ll, Lm, Ls are the sectoral employment
shares, as Ll + Lm + Ls = 1.
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The household’s optimal consumption bundle has to satisfy:
Cl
Cm
=
(
pl
pm
θm
θl
)−ε
, (20)
Cs
Cm
=
(
ps
pm
θm
θs
)−ε
. (21)
3.3 Competitive equilibrium and structural change
A competitive equilibrium is given by cutoff sector-of-work efficiencies {âm, âs}, unit
wage rates {ωl, ωm, ωs}, prices {pl, pm, ps}, and consumption demands {Cl, Cm, Cs},
given productivities {Al, Am, As}, where individuals, households and firms make op-
timal decisions, and all markets clear.
Using goods market clearing in all sectors (Yi = Ci for i = L,M, S), where the
supply is given by (1), (3) and (5), and the market clearing unit wage rates, (2), (4) and
(6), in the household’s optimality conditions, (20) and (21), we obtain the following:
Al
Am
Ll
Nm
=
( ωl
ωm
Am
Al︸ ︷︷ ︸
=pl/pm
θm
θl
)−ε
,
As
Am
Ns
Nm
=
( ωs
ωm
Am
As︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ps/pm
θm
θs
)−ε
.
The left hand side is the relative supply, while the right hand side is the relative de-
mand for low- and respectively high-skilled services compared to manufacturing. A
change in the relative productivity affects both the relative supply and the relative
demand.
An increase in relative manufacturing productivity compared to low-skilled ser-
vice productivity (Am/Al) has two direct effects: (i) it reduces the relative supply of
low-skilled services, (Yl/Ym), and (ii) through an increase in the relative price of low-
skilled services (pl/pm), it lowers the relative demand for low-skilled services. If low-
skilled services and manufacturing goods are complements, ε < 1, the effect through
relative prices is the weaker one, and relative supply falls by more than relative de-
mand. To restore equilibrium, the relative supply of low-skilled services has to in-
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crease and/or its relative demand has to fall compared to manufacturing.
In order for the relative supply to increase, the efficiency units of labor hired in
low-skilled services have to increase relative to manufacturing, which requires a rise
in the relative unit wage, ωl/ωm. At the same time, a rise in the relative unit wage also
increases the relative price of low-skilled services, thus lowering the relative demand.
Therefore the equilibrium requires a rise in the relative low-skilled service unit wage
compared to the manufacturing unit wage. Similarly, an increase in Am/As, through
its affect on relative supply and relative demand, requires a rise in ωs/ωm.
Using the definition of the optimal sector-of-work cutoffs (7) and (8), we can ex-
press the relative unit wages as ωl/ωm = âm and ωs/ωm = âm/âs. Substituting this
into the two above equations, and using the optimal sorting of individuals, (12), (13)
and (14), we obtain the following expressions, which allow us to formally analyze the
comparative static properties of the equilibrium:
Ll(âm, âs)
Nm(âm, âs)
âεm =
(
Am
Al
)1−ε(
θm
θl
)−ε
, (22)
Ns(âm, âs)
Nm(âm, âs)
(
âm
âs
)ε
=
(
Am
As
)1−ε(
θm
θs
)−ε
. (23)
These two equations implicitly define the equilibrium sector-of-work cutoffs, âm and
âs, and in turn these cutoffs fully characterize the equilibrium of the economy.
Proposition 1. When manufacturing goods and the two types of services are complements
(ε < 1), then faster productivity growth in manufacturing than in both types of services
(dAm/Am > dAs/As = dAl/Al), leads to a change in the optimal sorting of individuals
across sectors. In particular âm = ωl/ωm and âm/âs = ωs/ωm unambiguously increase, while
âs = ωl/ωs can rise or fall. This results in an unambiguous increase in labor in L, in efficiency
labor in S, and a reduction in efficiency and raw labor in M .
Proof. Total differentiation of (22) and (23). See appendix for details.
Proposition 1 confirms the results of Ngai and Pissarides (2007) in terms of effi-
ciency labor, rather than raw labor or employment shares: when sectoral outputs are
complements in consumption, efficiency labor needs to reallocate to the sectors which
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become relatively less productive. As manufacturing productivity grows the fastest,
efficiency labor has to move out of manufacturing into both low- and high-skilled ser-
vices. Since individuals optimally sort into the sector with the highest return for them,
this implies that the optimal sector-of-work cutoffs have to adjust. Proposition 1 states
and Figure 5 depicts what these adjustments entail. The adjustment to the new equi-
librium requires sector M to be squeezed from both sides, âm = ωl/ωm has to shift to
the right (ωl has to increase relative to ωm), and amâs/âm = amωm/ωs has to become
flatter (ωs has to increase relative to ωm). This is very intuitive: sector M has to shrink,
while sector L and S have to expand, which requires sector M unit wages to fall both
relative to sector S and sector L unit wages. It is worth to note that these results hold
for any underlying distribution of efficiency units of labor, f(am, as). However, since
sector L and S productivity grow at the same rate, in general it is ambiguous whether
the boundary between L and S shifts up or down (âs = ωl/ωs increases or decreases).
âm âm
âs
âs
âs
âm
am
âs
âm
am
am
as
âm âm
âs
âs
âs
âm
am
âs
âm
am
am
as
Figure 5: Change in the optimal sorting
The figure shows the possible shifts in âm and âs in response to an increase in relative manufactur-
ing productivity when the sectoral outputs are complements in consumption. The original cutoffs are
shown in gray, while the new ones are shown in black and bold. While âm unambiguously increases,
and âs/âm unambiguously decreases, the direction of change in âs is ambiguous.
To understand what these adjustments imply for employment shares (or for raw
labor) Figure 5 is useful. Efficiency labor in M is the aggregate amount of am in the
area bounded by âm and amâs/âm, while raw labor is just the mass of individuals in the
same area. Both the outward shift of âm and the flattening of âs/âm have a negative
impact on both raw and efficiency labor in M . Similarly efficiency labor in S is the
aggregate amount of as in the area bounded by âs and amâs/âm, while raw labor is the
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mass in the same area. If âs falls, as shown in the left panel, then efficiency and raw
labor in S increases. If âs increases, shown in the right panel, raw labor in S might
fall, while efficiency labor in S has to increase. The fact that efficiency labor in S has
to increase implies that the amount of efficiency labor in S lost due to the increase in
âs is smaller than the amount gained due to the decrease in âs/âm. However, since
the average as in the area lost is strictly lower than in the area gained, we cannot
determine, in general, whether in S raw labor increases or falls. Since in low-skilled
services efficiency and raw labor units are the same, the employment share of low-
skilled services increases.
In terms of relative average wages, in general it is not possible to sign the changes
predicted by the model. The reason is self-selection; the workers leaving manufactur-
ing are the ones that have a relatively low efficiency. As a consequence, the average ef-
ficiency in manufacturing increases when its employment share decreases. This tends
to increase the average wage in manufacturing compared to the other sectors, offset-
ting to some extent the direct effect of the falling relative manufacturing unit wage.
Without further assumptions, it is conceivable that the indirect effect through the av-
erage efficiency might overturn the direct effect of changing unit wages. To see this,
consider the average low-skilled service wage, (17), relative to the average manufac-
turing wage, (18):
wl
wm
=
ωl
ωm
Nm
Lm
=
âm
am
,
where am ≡ Nm/Lm is the average efficiency of manufacturing workers in M . The
percentage change in the average wage of low-skilled service workers relative to man-
ufacturing workers is then just:
d wl
wm
wl
wm
=
dâm
âm
− dam
am
,
i.e. the difference between the percentage change in the sector-of-work cutoff between
L andM and the percentage change in the average efficiency in sectorM . From Propo-
sition 1 we know that dâm
âm
is positive, the question is whether the average efficiency in
M can increase more in percentage terms than this.
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Similarly the average high-skilled service wage, (19), relative to the average manufac-
turing wage can be expressed as:
ws
wm
=
ωs
Ns
Ls
ωm
Nm
Lm
=
âm
âs
as
am
,
where as ≡ Ns/Ls is the average efficiency of high-skilled service workers in S. This
implies that the percentage change in the relative wage is:
d ws
wm
ws
wm
=
dâm
âm
− dâs
âs
+
das
as
− dam
am
.
The direct effect of the change in the cutoffs (dâm/âm − dâs/âs) is again positive by
Proposition 1, while in general its indirect effect through the average sectoral abilities
goes in the opposite direction. Again the overall change cannot be signed independent
of the underlying distribution of efficiency units and of the initial level of labor in the
different sectors. Even though for a general distribution we were not able to formally
show that the direct effect of the change in cutoffs always dominates the indirect effect
through average sectoral abilities, for the most commonly used classes of distributions
in all our simulations the relative average wages (for both L and S to M ) moved in the
same direction as the cutoffs.
Since the structural change literature focuses on employment shares and value
added shares, we also investigate our model’s implications for the relative value added.
We can show that relative sectoral value added shares increase in the sectors with
lower productivity growth if the sectoral outputs are complements in consumption.
Proposition 2. When manufacturing goods and the two types of services are complements
(ε < 1), then faster productivity growth in manufacturing than in both types of services
(dAm/Am > dAs/As = dAl/Al), increases the relative value added in both high- and low-
skilled services compared to manufacturing:
d
psYs
pmYm
> 0 and d
plYl
pmYm
> 0.
These results can be understood by considering the following. In this model, sectoral
25
value added is equal to the sectoral wage bill: piYi = piAiNi = ωiNi. Proposition 1
tells us that ωl/ωm = âm increases, that Ll increases, and Nm falls. Both relative unit
wages and effective labor changes increase the value added output of sector L relative
to sector M . Similarly, ωs/ωm = âm/âs also increases according to Proposition 1, while
efficiency labor in S increases and in M it falls.
The sectoral value added can be further expressed as piYi = ωiNi = wiLi, since the
sectoral wage bill can be expressed as either sectoral unit wage times sectoral efficiency
labor, or as sectoral average wage times sectoral raw labor. Using this latter expression
we can show that
piYi
pjYj
=
wi
wj
Li
Lj
.
According to our model relative sectoral value added has to equal the product of rela-
tive sectoral average wages and relative sectoral employment shares. This result holds
even if we include capital in the model, unless one assumes either imperfect capital
mobility across sectors, or different sectoral capital intensities. Since in the data the
relative sectoral value added does not equal the product of relative sectoral average
wages and employment shares, in our calibration we target relative average wages
and sectoral employment shares, as it is the evolution of these two measures that is
the focus of our paper.
4 Quantitative results
In this section we quantitatively assess the contribution of structural transformation to
the polarization of employment and wages across sectors. To do this we consider the
evolution of the competitive equilibrium in terms of employment shares and relative
average sectoral wages as productivity increases in manufacturing and in both low-
and high-skilled services. We calibrate our parameters to match four key moments in
1960, and then feed in the exogenous process for labor productivity to generate predic-
tions for the evolution of labor and wages. We choose 1960 as the starting point for the
quantitative evaluation of the model, because as documented in section 2.2 the con-
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traction of manufacturing employment is apparent in our data from 1960 onwards.23
We first describe the data targets and the calibration strategy, and then discuss the
quantitative importance of our mechanism.
4.1 Calibration
The four key moments are the relative average sectoral wages, wl
wm
and ws
wm
, and the
sectoral employment shares, Ll, Lm and Ls, which sum to one. Data for the average
sectoral wages and the sectoral employment shares come from the 1960 US Census
data. Employment shares are calculated as share of hours worked, and relative aver-
age wages are the sector premia, both as in section 2.2.
All parameters are time-invariant, and the only exogenous change over time is la-
bor productivity growth. The following parameters need to be calibrated: the param-
eters of the utility function θl, θm, θs, ε, the distribution of labor efficiencies, f(am, as),
and the initial sectoral labor productivities, Al(0), Am(0), As(0).
We present a very simple model of structural change, and we are only interested
in its predictions for sectoral employment shares and relative average sectoral wages,
but not in its predictions for any higher moment of the wage distribution. We therefore
choose a class of distributions for the labor efficiency endowments which requires only
a minimal choice of parameters: the (bivariate) uniform distribution. While we estab-
lished in Proposition 1 of section 3.3 the main qualitative predictions of the model, it
is likely that the quantitative effects depend on the class of underlying distributions
of sectoral efficiencies. For this reason, in section 4.3 we show our model’s predictions
for various alternative distributions, the parametrization of which require additional
assumptions.
For the baseline calibration we assume that labor efficiencies are distributed uni-
formly. Without loss of generality we normalize the mean of am and as to be unity.24
Given these assumptions, two parameters of the distribution are left to be calibrated,
23As explained later we use value added and employment data from the BEA to calculate the path
of labor productivities. In the BEA data manufacturing employment, in terms of full- and part-time
employees, is declining from 1947 onwards. Thus we focus on the part of the sample where both data
sources show the same patterns.
24See appendix for details that this is indeed a normalization.
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the minimum (and thus the maximum, given that the mean is one) of both labor effi-
ciencies, denoted by a˜m and a˜s. We calibrate these two parameters of the distribution
of efficiency units such that the observed employment shares and the relative average
wages in 1960 are consistent with each other, in the sense that if the model matches
employment, it also matches relative average wages. The procedure that we imple-
ment is the following. For any given distribution, we can compute what the observed
employment shares imply for average relative wages. In particular, for any a˜m and a˜s,
we can compute the cutoffs âm and âs that are implied by the observed employment
shares, i.e. the Ll(âm, âs), Lm(âm, âs), Ls = 1− Ll(âm, âs)− Lm(âm, âs) seen in the 1960
data. These values for a˜m, a˜s and âm, âs imply for relative average wages (combining
(17),(18) and (19)):
wl
wm
=
ωl
ωm
Nm(âm,âs)
Lm(âm,âs)
= âm
Lm(âm, âs)
Nm(âm, âs)
,
ws
wm
=
ωs
Ns
Ls
ωm
Nm
Lm
=
âm
âs
Lm(âm, âs)Nm(âm, âs)
Ls(âm, âs)Ns(âm, âs)
.
We then calibrate a˜m and a˜s to equalize the model implied relative average wages to
the ones observed in the data. Choosing the parameters of the efficiency units dis-
tribution in this way guarantees that if we match the employment shares, then the
relative average wages in 1960 are matched as well, and vice versa. However, we still
have to calibrate other parameters to ensure that in equilibrium we are matching these
moments in the first place. For this, we can either target the relative average wages,
the employment shares, or the sector-of-work cutoffs implied by these.
Left to calibrate are the parameters of the utility function and the initial labor pro-
ductivities. Previous literature has found a very low elasticity of substitution between
goods and services when output is measured in consumption value added terms. Ngai
and Pissarides (2008) find that plausible estimates are in the range (0, 0.3), while Her-
rendorf et al. (2013) find a value of ε = 0.002, which we use in our baseline calibration.
Of the remaining six parameters, θl, θm, θs and Al(0), Am(0), As(0) only two ratios mat-
ter for the equilibrium of this economy, as can be seen from (22) and (23). It is only the
ratio of the θs to the power of −ε multiplied by the ratios of initial labor productivi-
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ties to the power of 1 − ε that matter. Thus we calibrate τl ≡
(
Am(0)
Al(0)
)1−ε (
θm
θl
)−ε
and
τs ≡
(
Am(0)
As(0)
)1−ε (
θm
θs
)−ε
to match the sector-of-work cutoffs in 1960. This guarantees
that both the relative average sectoral wages and the employment shares in 1960 are
matched. The calibrated parameters are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Calibrated Parameters
Description Value
[a˜m, a˜m] range of manufacturing efficiency [0.40, 1.60][a˜s, a˜s] range of high-skilled service efficiency [0.02, 1.98]ε CES b/w L,M and S in consumption 0.002
τl relative weight on M 0.49
τs relative weight on S 0.91
The value of the elasticity of substitution, ε, is taken from the literature. Conditional on its value, the
remaining parameters are chosen to match the sectoral employment shares and relative average wages
in 1960. In the robustness checks, we recalibrate the τ ’s for different values of ε.
Similarly to Ngai and Petrongolo (2014) we calculate labor productivity growth by
dividing sectoral value added output data from Herrendorf et al. (2013) with sectoral
labor data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We rely on Herrendorf et al.
(2013) for the consumption value added data rather than taking these data directly
from the BEA, since as Herrendorf et al. point out, the BEA data come from the pro-
duction side and thus contain both consumption and investment. The authors argue
that rather than assuming that all investment is done in manufacturing, the consump-
tion component of each sector’s value added needs to be properly calculated. Since
neither the industry level data on consumption value added output in Herrendorf
et al. (2013), nor the employment data from the BEA is detailed enough, we cannot
break down the labor productivity growth of services into low- and high-skilled ser-
vices. Therefore we assume that productivity growth in low- and high-skilled services
is the same.25
Table 3 contains the average annual labor productivity growth in manufacturing
and in low- and high-skilled services jointly for each decade between 1960 and 2007,
as well as for the entire period. According to our calculations the growth of labor pro-
ductivity in manufacturing was higher than in the combined services category in each
of the decades considered. It is worth to note that both productivity growth and the
25See appendix for details.
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Table 3: Annual average labor productivity growth
Based on raw labor Adjusted by average efficiency
Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services
1960-1970 1.0220 1.0130 1.0210 1.0137
1970-1980 1.0155 1.0078 1.0145 1.0085
1980-1990 1.0304 1.0060 1.0277 1.0064
1990-2000 1.0316 1.0143 1.0303 1.0149
2000-2007 1.0263 1.0143 1.0245 1.0146
1960-2007 1.0251 1.0109 1.0235 1.0114
Labor productivity growth rates in the first two columns are calculated by dividing sectoral value added
data taken from Herrendorf et al. (2013) by sectoral raw employment growth data taken from the BEA.
In the second two columns we divide by effective employment growth, which we calculate based on
our calibrated distribution of labor efficiencies.
relative productivity growth between manufacturing and services varied significantly
decade by decade. For this reason, we evaluate the quantitative performance of the
model in two ways: (i) by plugging in the average annual growth rates for the en-
tire period; and (ii) by plugging in the decennial growth rates. The first two columns
contain these growth rates when using raw employment growth.
It is well known that if individuals self-select based on their endowments of effi-
ciency units and one cannot observe these efficiency units, then the measurement of
changes in average wages or in labor productivity will be biased.26 In our model, ex-
panding sectors soak up, while contracting sectors shed relatively less efficient work-
ers. This implies that the average efficiency in manufacturing increases, while the
average efficiency in high-skilled services falls over time, which – if left uncorrected
– leads to an overestimation of productivity growth in manufacturing relative to ser-
vices.27 To understand the potential magnitude of this bias, we calculate the change in
average sectoral labor efficiencies implied by the change in the cutoff efficiencies re-
quired to match sectoral employment shares between 1960 and 2007, for the calibrated
distribution of underlying labor efficiencies. In Table 3 the last two columns show the
labor productivity growth corrected for the calculated change in average efficiencies.
As it is clear from this table, under our calibration of the efficiency units distribution,
26Carneiro and Lee (2011) estimated the bias in the measurement of the skill premium, while Young
(2014) pointed this out in the context of measuring productivity growth differentials across sectors.
27This is true only when manufacturing employment is shrinking, and services employment is ex-
panding.
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the bias in the relative productivity differentials is very small.28
4.2 Wage and employment dynamics
To understand the strength of the mechanisms that we highlight, we simulate the com-
petitive equilibrium of the economy at different productivity levels. We fix the prefer-
ence and the sectoral efficiency distribution parameters at the values calibrated using
data only from 1960, and feed in various labor productivity growth measures as calcu-
lated in Table 3. Our ultimate interest is the endogenous path of employment shares
and relative average wages.
Figure 6 plots the dynamics for our baseline calibration and baseline productivity
growth rates. These rates are the annual average raw labor productivity growth for
the period 1960-2007: 2.51% annual growth in manufacturing, and 1.09% growth in
combined services (bottom left numbers in Table 3). The top left panel shows the path
of M and of both L and S sector productivity. Since productivity growth is highest
in the manufacturing sector, but manufactured goods and both types of services are
complements in consumption, the increased demand for the output of all sectors in
equilibrium is met through a reallocation of labor towards low- and high-skilled ser-
vices, as we showed in Proposition 1. The increased demand for labor in low- and
high-skilled services puts an upward pressure on the unit wages in these sectors rel-
ative to the unit wage in manufacturing, thus changing the optimal sector-of-work
cutoffs for individuals. The top right panel shows the endogenous response of âm and
âs: the cutoff efficiency between L and M increases, while the cutoff between L and S
decreases monotonically. This implies a continuous increase in S relative to L sector
unit wages, which improve relative to M sector unit wages. The bottom two panels
show our model’s predictions (solid lines) contrasted with the data (dashed lines) for
our measures of interest. Not surprisingly, the model matches the 1960 employment
shares (bottom left panel) and the 1960 relative average wages (bottom right panel)
very well, as we targeted these measures. But the model also does extremely well
28Young (2014) finds that the implied bias might potentially be so large as to overturn the conven-
tional wisdom of faster productivity growth in manufacturing. However, with our calibrated distribu-
tion of labor efficiencies the bias is relatively small.
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Figure 6: Transition of the benchmark model
The top left panel shows the exogenous change in labor productivity. The top right panel shows the
endogenous response of the optimal sector-of-work cutoffs. The bottom left panel shows the predicted
employment shares (solid line) and their actual path (dashed line), while the bottom right panel shows
the model predicted (solid line) and actual path (dashed line) of the relative average sectoral wages.
in predicting the paths of employment shares and relative average wages after 1960.
Our baseline model predicts at least three quarters of the change in the employment
share of each sector.29 In our model, as discussed in section 3.3, the relative average
wage changes are driven by changes in the relative unit wages and changes in the
relative average sectoral labor efficiencies. As mentioned earlier, these two effects, in
general, go in opposite directions, however the direct effect of the unit wages typically
dominates the indirect effect that it has on average sectoral efficiencies. This is true
in our baseline model as well, and our model overall predicts about 90 per cent of the
29In the data the employment share of the high-skilled service sector increased by 12 percentage
points, our model predicts a 9 percentage point increase. The employment share of manufacturing
workers in the data fell by 20 percentage points, our model predicts a 16 percentage point contraction.
Finally, the low-skilled service sector employment share increased by 8 percentage points in the data,
whereas our model predicts a 7 percentage point increase.
32
growth in the relative low-skilled service sector wages, and 70 percent of the growth in
the relative average high-skilled service sector wages compared to manufacturing.30
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Figure 7: Transition of the model with selection-adjusted productivity growth rates
As we argued earlier, the differences in productivity growth between services and
manufacturing are in general overestimated when not taking into account the effects
of the endogenous sorting of workers, which systematically changes the average ef-
ficiency in each sector. We therefore repeat our numerical exercise with the baseline
calibration, but feeding in the average productivity growth rates adjusted for this bias.
As can be seen in Table 3, when correcting for selection, we get a slightly lower 2.35%
average annual productivity growth in manufacturing, and a slightly higher 1.14% an-
nual rate in services. Figure 7 shows the dynamics of employment shares and relative
average wages implied by the model in this case, which are very similar to the results
of the baseline model. Since the relative annual productivity gain in manufacturing
is lower once we correct for the changing selection of individuals, the equilibrium re-
quires less labor to shift out of manufacturing. This brings the model’s predictions a
bit further away from the data, both in terms of employment shifts and relative wages.
The path of employment shares and relative average wages generated by the model
are very smooth compared to the data. This is not surprising, as we assumed a con-
30In the data the relative average wage of low-skilled service workers compared to manufacturing
workers increased by 14 per cent, while that of the high-skilled service workers increased by 21 per
cent. In the simulation the average wage in low-skilled services compared to manufacturing increased
by 12 per cent (19 per cent improvement in relative unit wages and 6 per cent decline in relative average
efficiency), while the relative average high-skilled service sector wages increased by 14 per cent (25 per
cent increase in relative unit wages and a more than 8 per cent drop in relative average efficiency).
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stant annual growth rate of sectoral labor productivity between 1960 and 2007. How-
ever, Table 3 reveals that the growth rates have varied substantially over time. Figure
8 shows the simulated model contrasted with the data when feeding in the growth
rates calculated for each period using raw employment.31 The differential productiv-
ity gain of manufacturing across periods implies a less smooth change in employment
shares and relative average wages across sectors, while the overall predicted changes
are the same. Quantitatively, when feeding in the actual series of productivity growth
(shown in the top left panel), the model predicts the actual time path of these vari-
ables even better. In the data manufacturing productivity growth accelerated relative
to services in 1980, which might be driven by routinization having a stronger impact
in manufacturing. The model implies that from then on –in line with the data– the
31Figure 16 in the appendix shows the model’s predictions for the decennial selection-adjusted
growth rates.
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Figure 8: Transition of the model with decennial growth
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wage growth in high-skilled services compared to manufacturing increased, and that
low-skilled service employment expansion and manufacturing employment contrac-
tion accelerated.
Since employment and wages are the focus of this paper, we targeted their 1960
level in our calibration. As we discussed in section 3.3, a model without capital in-
tensity differences and with perfect capital mobility across sectors cannot match the
level of sectoral relative average wages, employment and expenditure shares jointly.
Nonetheless, our model does quite a good job in predicting the path of the relative
value added share in manufacturing compared to combined services between 1960
and 2007. Figure 9 shows the relative value added in manufacturing compared to the
value added in combined services in the model (solid line) and in the data (dashed
line).32 Even though the level of relative value added is not matched by the model, the
overall decline is replicated quite well: in the data it declined by 53 per cent, while in
the model it declined by 58 per cent.
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Figure 9: Transition of relative manufacturing value added
The graph shows the value added in manufacturing relative to combined services as predicted by the
model (solid line) and in the data (dashed line).
32We plot combined services, as the BEA data is not available for fine enough industry classification
to calculate the value added in low- and high-skilled services from the data.
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4.3 Robustness checks
In our baseline calibration we assume that the distribution of sectoral efficiencies is
uniform. As discussed earlier, while our main qualitative predictions do not depend
on the distribution, the quantitative predictions are likely to be affected by it. In partic-
ular, assuming a less dispersed and more correlated distribution takes the model closer
to one where labor is homogeneous (i.e. similar to Ngai and Pissarides (2007)). In the
limiting case, where all individuals are endowed with the same amount of efficiency
units of labor in all sectors, unit and average sectoral wages need to be equalized at all
times, implying constant relative average wages. We recalibrate the model assuming
a normal distribution (truncated at zero for both am and as) and a lognormal distribu-
tion for three levels of correlation: 0, 0.3 and 0.5. As Table 8 in the appendix shows,
the model’s quantitative predictions for employment share changes are virtually un-
changed in all cases. While average wages relative to manufacturing increase in both
the high- and the low-skilled service sector for all calibrations, the magnitude of these
changes varies quite a bit. As we impose a higher correlation between am and as,
matching employment shares and relative wages in 1960 requires a more compressed
distribution. The higher the correlation and the lower the variance of am and as, the
smaller is the predicted adjustment in the relative average sectoral wages. This is not
surprising as the model gets closer to the case of homogeneous labor. In the cases
considered in Table 8, even with the highest correlation and smallest variances, the
model predicts one third of the increase the average low-skilled and one seventh of
the increase in average high-skilled service sector wage relative to the average manu-
facturing wage.
In our baseline calibration we use ε = 0.002 for the elasticity of substitution be-
tween goods and services (measured in value-added terms) as estimated by Herren-
dorf et al. (2013), which is at the lower end of estimates reported by Ngai and Pis-
sarides (2008). To see whether our results are robust to higher, yet plausible, values of
this parameter, we explore how our results change when using ε = 0.02 or ε = 0.2, nat-
urally recalibrating the other parameters to match moments of the 1960 data.33 Qual-
33For ε = 0.02 these are τl = 0.49 and τs = 0.91; for ε = 0.2 we obtain τl = 0.48 and τs = 0.88.
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itatively the transition paths look exactly the same. A higher elasticity of substitution
implies that the effective employment in low- and high-skilled services have to in-
crease less, and the effective employment in manufacturing has to fall less in order
to meet equilibrium demands. This in turn implies less adjustment in employment
shares and in relative average wages. Increasing the value of the elasticity of sub-
stitution takes the model’s predictions further away from the time paths observed in
the data. But as can be seen in Table 9 in the appendix, even with the least favorable
calibration (high ε and labor productivity growth adjusted for selection), our model
predicts 59 per cent of the increase in L and 44 per cent of the increase in S sector av-
erage wages relative to M . In terms of employment share changes, the model predicts
at least half of the observed changes between 1960 and 2007.34 Overall, the benchmark
calibration with ε = 0.002 as estimated by Herrendorf et al. (2013) seems to do best in
replicating the data.
5 Conclusions
The literature on polarization of employment and wages has typically focused on oc-
cupations. We present a set of new empirical facts that suggest that in addition to
reallocations between occupations within industries, also shifts between industries
contribute to the polarization of labor markets. Moreover, we show that in terms of
broadly defined industries, polarization was present as early as 1950-1960 and directly
linked to the decline of manufacturing employment. Based on this evidence we pro-
pose a novel explanation, one based on structural change. A methodological contri-
bution of our paper is that we develop a multi-sector model with heterogeneous labor
in Roy-style fashion, the most parsimonious setup that yet allows heterogeneity in
wages. An insight from our model is that unbalanced technological progress does not
only lead to structural change, the reallocation of employment across sectors, but also
affects sectoral average wages. We find that higher productivity growth in manufac-
turing than in services increases employment and wages in both the low-skilled and
34It predicts a 5 percentage point increase in L, an 11 percentage point fall in M , and a 6 percentage
point increase in S employment share compared to the 8, 20 and 12 percentage point changes in the
data.
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the high-skilled service sector, thus leading to the polarization of the labor market.
This simple model does remarkably well in predicting the sectoral wage and employ-
ment patterns of the last 50 years.
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Appendix
Data
We use data from the US Census of 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and the Ameri-
can Community Survey (ACS) of 2007, which we access from IPUMS-USA, provided
by Ruggles, Alexander, Genadek, Goeken, Schroeder, and Sobek (2010). Following
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Autor and Dorn (2013) we restrict the sample to in-
dividuals who were in the labor force and of age 16 to 64 in the year preceding the
survey. We drop residents of institutional group quarters and unpaid family work-
ers. We also drop respondents with missing earnings or hours worked data and those
who work in agricultural occupations/industries or in the military. Our employment
measure is the product of weeks worked times usual number of hours per week. We
compute hourly wages as earnings divided by the product of usual hours and weeks
worked.35
To construct the 30-year change graphs of Figure 1 and 10, and the 10-year change
graphs of Figure 11 we follow the methodology used in Autor et al. (2006)), Acemoglu
and Autor (2011), and Autor and Dorn (2013), which requires a balanced panel of
occupations. Dorn (2009) and Autor and Dorn (2013) provide a balanced panel of oc-
cupational classifications (‘occ1990dd’) over 1980-2008, which we use to construct a bal-
anced panel over 1950-2007 by aggregating occupational codes as needed. This leaves
us with 183 balanced occupational codes. Figures 1, 10, and 11 plot the smoothed
changes in average log hourly wages and total hours worked at each percentile of the
occupational skill distribution. These skill percentiles are constructed by ranking the
balanced occupations according to their 1950 (Figure 10 and top row of Figure 11) or
1980 mean hourly wages (Figure 1 and bottom row of Figure 11), and then splitting
them into 100 groups, each making up 1 percentile of 1950 or 1980 employment.
Figure 10 shows the change in log real hourly wages and employment, similarly as
Figure 1, with the difference that the ranking of occupations is based on their 1950 log
35Since in 1950 the Census did not include usual hours worked, we use hours worked last week
instead. In 1960 and 1970 the Census asked only for an interval of hours and weeks worked last year;
we use the midpoint of the interval given.
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Figure 10: Smoothed wage and employment polarization 1950 ranking
Notes: Data and left and right panel same as in Figure 1, except occupations are ranked based on their
1950 mean wages.
real hourly wage. The graph reinforces the message of Figure 1. The left panel shows
that wages have been polarizing from 1950 onwards, with the polarization most pro-
nounced in the earlier periods. The right panel shows that the polarization of employ-
ment is present in all 30-year periods starting from 1960, with the most pronounced
polarization between 1970-2000.
Figure 11 shows the wage and employment change of occupations for 10-year pe-
riods, with occupations ranked based on the 1950 wages (top row) and the 1980 wages
(bottom row). These graphs show that polarization does not happen on a decade-by-
decade basis. In some decades the top gains, while in others the bottom, but it is never
the middle-wage occupations that gain the most in terms of wages or employment.
In the text we document polarization in terms of occupations for 183 and 10 oc-
cupation categories (in Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively), here we show it for in an
even coarser classification. As in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) we classify occupation
groups into the following categories: manual, routine, and abstract.36 Figure 12 shows
the patterns of polarization both in terms of wages and employment shares between
1950 and 2007 for these three broad categories. The right panel shows that the em-
ployment share of routine occupations has been falling, of abstract occupations has
been increasing since the 1950s, while of manual occupations, following a slight com-
36Acemoglu and Autor (2011) have a similar graph of the path of employment shares of four occu-
pation categories (abstract, routine cognitive, routine non-cognitive, manual) between 1960 and 2007.
Here we show for 3 categories, starting from 1950, and more importantly, we also show the path of
relative occupational wages.
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Figure 11: Smoothed wage and employment polarization, 10-year change
Notes: Data and left and right panel as in Figure 1. All panels show 10-year changes rather than 30-year
changes. Occupations are ranked based on their 1950 mean wages in the top two panels, and based on
their 1980 mean wages in the bottom two panels.
pression until 1960, has been steadily increasing. The left panel shows the path of the
relative average manual and abstract wage compared to the routine wage. It is worth
to note that, as expected, manual workers on average earn less than routine workers,
while abstract workers earn more. However, over time, the advantage of routine jobs
over manual jobs has been falling, and the advantage of abstract jobs over routine jobs
has been rising. Thus, the middle earning group, the routine workers, lost both in
terms of relative average wage and employment share to the benefit of manual and
abstract workers. In other words, also in terms of these three broad occupations there
is clear evidence for polarization.
Categorization of occupations
Following Acemoglu and Autor (2011) we classify occupations into three categories,
which are used in Figure 12:
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Figure 12: Polarization for broad occupations
Notes: Relative average wages and employment shares (in terms of hours) are calculated from the same
data as in Figure 1. For details of the occupation classification see below.
- Manual (low-skilled non-routine): housekeeping, cleaning, protective service, food
prep and service, building, grounds cleaning, maintenance, personal appearance, recre-
ation and hospitality, child care workers, personal care, service, healthcare support;
- Routine: construction trades, extractive, machine operators, assemblers, inspectors,
mechanics and repairers, precision production, transportation and material moving
occupations, sales, administrative support, sales, administrative support;
- Abstract (skilled non-routine): managers, management related, professional specialty,
technicians and related support.
Categorization of industries
Based on our theory we classify the industries into three sectors, which are used in
Figure 3:
- Low-skilled services: personal services, entertainment, low-skilled transport (bus
service and urban transit, taxicab service, trucking service, warehousing and stor-
age, services incidental to transportation), low-skilled business and repair services
(automotive rental and leasing, automobile parking and carwashes, automotive re-
pair and related services, electrical repair shops, miscellaneous repair services), retail
trade, wholesale trade;
- Manufacturing: mining, construction, manufacturing;
- High-skilled services: professional and related services, finance, insurance and real
estate, communications, high-skilled business services (advertising, services to dwellings
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and other buildings, personnel supply services, computer and data processing ser-
vices, detective and protective services, business services not elsewhere classified),
communications, utilities, high-skilled transport (railroads, U.S. Postal Service, water
transportation, air transportation), public administration.
Table 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics for sectoral employment:
Table 4: Descriptive statistics by industry
low-skilled services manufacturing high-skilled services
Highschool Dropout 20.66% 27.54% 8.27%
Highschool Graduate 36.76% 37.57% 24.36%
Some College 28.33% 21.19% 29.05%
College Degree 11.20% 10.37% 23.00%
Postgraduate 3.05% 3.34% 15.32%
Mean Years of Education 12.41 11.96 14.05
Female Share 44.35% 23.33% 51.37%
Foreign-Born Share 12.05% 11.21% 8.97%
Occupation and sector premia
In Figures 3 and 12 as well as in our quantitative exercise we focused on relative
average residual wages. We obtain these by regressing log hourly wages on sector
dummies and on a set of controls, comprising of a polynomial in potential experience
(defined as age - years of schooling - 6), dummies for gender, race, and born abroad.
Table 5: Regression of log hourly wages: sector effects
Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007
low-sk. serv. -0.28∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
high-sk. serv. -0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 113635 459564 579290 958318 1094458 1235282 1308885
R2 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.19
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6: Regression of log hourly wages: occupation effects
Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007
manual -0.41∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
abstract 0.17∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 113635 459564 579290 958318 1094458 1235282 1308885
R2 0.23 0.28 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Tables 5 and 6 show the regression results. Since we omit the dummy for manufac-
turing, the implied relative wage of a low-skilled (high-skilled) service worker is given
by the exponential of the estimated coefficient on the low-skilled (high-skilled) service
sector dummy. The regression specification to compute residual occupational wages
is analogue, with the sector dummies replaced by occupation dummies; we omit the
dummy for routine occupations, such that relative wages compared to routine occu-
pations are given by the exponential of the occupation dummies.
In the text we show the coefficients on the sectoral dummies from wage regres-
sions, and in Figure 12 the relative average occupational wages. In Figure 13 we show
the reverse: the sectoral relative average wages compared to manufacturing, and the
coefficients on occupational dummies from a wage regression. The patterns are left
unchanged.
The role of gender and age composition changes
Figure 14 demonstrates that the sectoral employment share changes are not driven by
changes in the age, gender, race composition of the labor force. The counterfactual
industry employment shares are generated by fixing the sectoral employment share
of each age-gender-race cell at its 1960 level, and allowing the employment shares of
the cells to change. While it can be seen that the counterfactual employment shares
(the dashed lines) qualitatively move in the same direction as the actual employment
shares (the solid lines), in terms of magnitude the counterfactual employment shares
move much less. This implies that the changing composition of the labor force is not
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Figure 13: Wage polarization for sectors and occupations
Notes: Same data and classification as in Figure 3 and 12. The left panel shows the relative average
wages of high-skilled and low-skilled service workers compared to manufacturing workers. The right
panel shows the occupation premium for abstract and manual workers compared to routine workers,
and their 95% confidence intervals, as estimated in Table 6.
the main driving force of the evolution of sectoral employment.
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Figure 14: Counterfactual exercise: only changes in the gender-age composition of the
labor force
Notes: Employment shares (in terms of hours) are calculated from the same data as in Figure 3. The
actual data is shown as solid lines, while the dashed line show how the employment shares of industries
would have evolved if only the relative size of gender-age cells in the labor force had changed over time.
The role of industry shifts in occupational employment shares
In Table 1 of the main text we showed a shift-share decomposition for the changes
in occupational employment between 1950 and 2007, and alternatively between 1960
and 2007. In Table 7 we show this decomposition of employment share changes into
a between-industry and a within-industry component for each decade. While we find
a declining contribution of between-industry shifts since 1980, which might be due
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routinization then taking off, again we find that a sizable part of the occupational
employment share changes is due to shifts between industries.
Table 7: Decomposition of the changes in occupational employment shares by decade
1950-60 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-00 2000-07
3 occupations, 3 sectors
Manual
Total ∆ -2.71 -0.07 0.67 0.31 0.85 3.93
Between ∆ -0.94 0.55 0.47 0.95 0.47 0.44
Within ∆ -1.76 -0.63 0.21 -0.65 0.39 3.48
Routine
Total ∆ -0.65 -3.86 -3.09 -5.57 -5.24 -1.39
Between ∆ 0.94 -1.41 -1.22 -1.58 -0.98 -0.70
Within ∆ -1.59 -2.45 -1.86 -3.99 -4.26 -0.69
Abstract
Total ∆ 3.35 3.93 2.41 5.27 4.39 -2.54
Between ∆ 0.00 0.85 0.76 0.63 0.51 0.26
Within ∆ 3.35 3.08 1.66 4.63 3.87 -2.80
Average
Total ∆ -0.15 -1.71 -1.26 -1.71 -1.21 -1.02
Between ∆ 0.54 -0.69 -0.53 -0.64 -0.29 -0.20
Within ∆ -0.69 -1.02 -0.74 -1.07 -0.91 -0.82
10 occupations, 13 industries
Manual
Total ∆ -3.35 0.90 0.46 0.23 0.55 4.37
Between ∆ -2.03 0.96 0.97 1.73 0.97 0.95
Within ∆ -1.32 -0.06 -0.51 -1.51 -0.42 3.42
Routine
Total ∆ -1.44 -4.93 -4.56 -7.40 -5.85 -1.33
Between ∆ 1.93 -3.55 -2.74 -2.84 -1.73 -1.31
Within ∆ -3.37 -1.38 -1.81 -4.57 -4.12 -0.02
Abstract
Total ∆ 3.69 4.60 2.39 6.19 5.68 -3.01
Between ∆ 0.70 2.36 1.49 1.20 1.07 0.61
Within ∆ 2.99 2.24 0.90 4.99 4.61 -3.62
Average
Total ∆ -0.16 -0.45 -0.50 -0.48 -0.12 -0.31
Between ∆ 0.29 -0.38 -0.27 -0.23 -0.07 -0.05
Within ∆ -0.45 -0.07 -0.23 -0.24 -0.04 -0.26
Notes: Same data as in Figure 1. For each occupational category, the first row presents the change in
the share of employment (in terms of hours worked), the second the between-industry component, and
the third the within-industry component for the time interval given at the top. The top panel uses 3
occupations and 3 sectors, the bottom panel 10 occupations and 13 industries.
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As an alternative way to asses the importance of the employment reallocations be-
tween industries for the shifts in the broad occupation categories, we conduct the fol-
lowing counterfactual exercise: we fix the industry shares in employment (in terms
of hours worked) at their 1960 levels and let the within-industry share of occupa-
tions follow their actual path, and compute how the occupational shares would have
evolved in the absence of between-industry shifts. Figure 15 shows the resulting time
series (dashed) and the actual data (solid). This exercise shows that if there had been
only within-industry shifts, qualitatively the employment of the occupation categories
would have evolved as in the actual data, but that quantitatively they cannot explain
all of the changes. We therefore conclude that also between-industry shifts account for
the polarization of occupational employment.
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Figure 15: Counterfactual exercise: only-within industry shift of occupations
Notes: Employment shares (in terms of hours) are calculated from the same data as in Figure 13. The
actual data is shown as solid lines, while the dashed line show how the occupational employment
shares would have evolved in the absence of reallocations across industries.
Model
Proof of Proposition 1. Starting from:
Ll(âm, âs)
Nm(âm, âs)
âεm =
(
Am
Al
)1−ε(
θm
θl
)−ε
,
Ns(âm, âs)
Nm(âm, âs)
(
âm
âs
)ε
=
(
Am
As
)1−ε(
θm
θs
)−ε
.
A change in productivities triggers changes in the equilibrium cutoffs, âm and âs, in
such a way that the above conditions remain satisfied. Total differentiation then im-
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plies:
ε
dâm
âm
+
dLl
Ll
− dNm
Nm
= (1− ε)d
Am
Al
Am
Al
, (24)
ε
(
dâm
âm
− dâs
âs
)
+
dNs
Ns
− dNm
Nm
= (1− ε)d
Am
As
Am
As
. (25)
Applying the Leibniz rule to the expressions for Ll(âm, âs), Nm(âm, âs) and Ns(âm, âs),
we get the following expressions for the change in the effective and raw labor supplies
as a function of the change in âm and in âs is
dLl(âm, âs) =
∂nl
∂âm
dâm +
∂nl
∂âs
dâs =
∫ âs
0
f(âm, as)das︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡C1
·dâm +
∫ âm
0
f(am, âs)dam︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡C2
·dâs,
(26)
dNm(âm, âs) = −
∫ âs
0
f(âm, as)das︸ ︷︷ ︸
=C1
·âmdâm −
∫ ∞
âm
a2mf(am,
âs
âm
am)dam︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡C3
· âs
âm
(
dâm
âm
− dâs
âs
)
,
(27)
dNs(âm, âs) = −
∫ âm
0
f(am, âs)dam︸ ︷︷ ︸
=C2
·âsdâs +
∫ ∞
âs
a2sf(
âm
âs
as, as)das︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡C4
· âm
âs
(
dâm
âm
− dâs
âs
)
,
(28)
similarly
dLm(âm, âs) = −
∫ âs
0
f(âm, as)das︸ ︷︷ ︸
=C1
·dâm −
∫ ∞
âm
amf(am,
âs
âm
am)dam︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡C5
· âs
âm
(
dâm
âm
− dâs
âs
)
,
(29)
dLs(âm, âs) = −
∫ âm
0
f(am, âs)dam︸ ︷︷ ︸
=C2
·dâs +
∫ ∞
âs
asf(
âm
âs
as, as)das︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡C6
· âm
âs
(
dâm
âm
− dâs
âs
)
.
(30)
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Plugging these into (24) and (25) and re-arranging we get:
dâm
âm
[
ε+
C1âm
Ll
+
C1(âm)
2
Nm
+
C3
âs
âm
Nm
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡B1>0
+
dâs
âs
[
C2âs
Ll
− C3
âs
âm
Nm
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡B2
= (1− ε)d
Am
Al
Am
Al︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡D1
,
dâm
âm
[
ε+
C4
âm
âs
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+
C1(âm)
2
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+
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âs
âm
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]
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−dâs
âs
[
ε+
C2(âs)
2
Ns
+
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âm
âs
Ns
+
C3
âs
âm
Nm
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡B4>0
= (1− ε)d
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≡D2
.
This leads to
dâs
âs
=
B3D1 −B1D2
B3B2 +B1B4
,
dâm
âm
=
D2B2 +B4D1
B3B2 +B1B4
,
where B3B2 + B1B4 > 0 can be easily verified by multiplying out the terms. Hence
to determine the response in âm and in âs, we only need to consider the sign of the
numerator. If D1 = D2 > 0, i.e. the growth rate of Al is equal to the growth rate of As,
and lower than the growth rate of Am, then the following expressions can be obtained:
dâs
âs
=
D
B3B2 +B1B4
(B3 −B1) = D
B3B2 +B1B4
(
C4
âm
âs
Ns
− C1âm
Ll
)
, (31)
dâm
âm
=
D
B3B2 +B1B4
(B2 +B4) =
D
B3B2 +B1B4
(
ε+
C2(âs)
2
Ns
+
C4
âm
âs
Ns
+
C2âs
Ll
)
> 0.
(32)
As this shows, dâm
âm
> 0. The sign of dâs
âs
is ambiguous in general, but it is straightfor-
ward that dâm
âm
− dâs
âs
> 0:
(
dâm
âm
− dâs
âs
)
=
D
B3B2 +B1B4
(
ε+
C2âs
Ll
+
C2(âs)
2
Ns
+
C1âm
Ll
)
> 0.
This together with (27) and (29) imply thatNm and Lm always decrease. These changes
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are:
dNm(âm, âs) = −
(
C1(âm)
2dâm
âm
+ C3
âs
âm
(
dâm
âm
− dâs
âs
))
< 0,
dLm(âm, âs) = −
(
C1âm
dâm
âm
+ C5
âs
âm
(
dâm
âm
− dâs
âs
))
< 0.
By plugging in (31) and (32) into (26) we can show that employment in sector L in-
creases:
dLl(âm, âs) = C1âm
dâm
âm
+ C2âs
dâs
âs
=
D
B3B2 +B1B4
[
C1âm
(
ε+
C2(âs)
2
Ns
+
C4
âm
âs
Ns
)
+ C2âs
C4
âm
âs
Ns
]
> 0.
By plugging in (8) and (7) into (28) we can show that effective employment in sector S
increases:
dNs(âm, âs) =
D
B3B2 +B1B4
[
C2â
2
s
C1âm
Ll
+ C4
âm
âs
(
ε+
C2âs
Ll
+
C1âm
Ll
)]
> 0.
Quantitative results
Normalization of the mean of am and as
In what follows we show that the calibration and the transition path of the model
when setting the mean of am and as to 1 is exactly the same as when setting the mean
of am to c and the mean of as to d. As explained in the main text, we calibrate the
model in two steps, first (for a given normalization for the means), we identify the
minimum labor efficiencies in sector M (a˜m) and S (a˜s), which allow the employment
shares and relative average wages to be matched at the same time. In this first step
we also identify the cutoff efficiencies âm and âs, which given this distribution would
give rise to the targeted employment shares and relative average wages. In the second
step, we calibrate τl and τs for which, given the distribution, the equilibrium cutoffs
are the ones found in the previous step.
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Let a˜1,1m , a˜1,1s , τ 1,1l and τ 1,1s denote the calibrated parameter values when both means are
normalized to 1, and the equilibrium cutoff efficiencies be denoted by â1,1m and â1,1s . It
can be shown that the calibration in case the means of am and as are normalized to
c and d leads to a˜c,dm = ca˜1,1m , a˜c,ds = da˜1,1s , τ c,dl = cε−1τ 1,1l and τ c,ds = (c/d)ε−1τ 1,1s , with
equilibrium cutoffs given by âc,dm = câ1,1m and âc,ds = dâ1,1s . The calibration procedure
thus leads to exactly the same initial equilibrium whether the means are normalized
to (1, 1) or (c, d).
What is left to show is that these two different setups lead to the same equilibrium
changes as relative productivities change. Let us denote the proportional change in â1,1m
by u and the proportional change in â1,1s by v following a change in relative productiv-
ities Am/Al and Am/As. It can be shown that cutoffs uâc,dm and vâc,ds clear the market for
the new relative productivities, and therefore lead to the same change in employment
shares and equilibrium wages as in the case when the means are normalized to (1, 1).
Labor productivity calculation
To calculate labor productivity growth for our classification of industries, similarly to
Ngai and Petrongolo (2014), we divide the sectoral value added by the sectoral em-
ployment. To calculate our sectoral value added data, we take industry level value
added data from Herrendorf et al. (2013), which are based on the BEA data but are
corrected for the use of any industry’s value added as investment. To ensure consis-
tency with the sector classification in the value-added data, we use data on employ-
ment from the BEA, which for the time span that we need (1960-2007) is only available
in terms of number of employees. As it is not possible to distinguish between low-
and high-skilled services in this data, we aggregate up both the value-added data
from Herrendorf et al. (2013) and the BEA employment data to the manufacturing
sector and a combined service sector given our classification. Then we compute la-
bor productivity in manufacturing and in services by dividing the value added by the
employment for each year.
To correct for the ability bias that arises when workers self-select into sectors, we
make use of the functional form of the labor efficiency distribution which we have
calibrated. Given this distribution we can calculate the sector-of-work cutoffs âm and
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âs needed to match the employment shares calculated from the Census and ACS data.
Given the cutoffs and the distribution of labor efficiencies, we can calculate the aver-
age efficiency in each sector for these years (1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2007). We
then generate effective employment from these average labor efficiencies and the raw
employment data from the BEA. The adjusted labor productivity is just the sectoral
value added divided by the effective employment.
Employment and wage dynamics with decennial and adjusted labor productivity
Figure 16 shows the model implied wage and employment dynamics when feeding in
the growth rates computed for each model period adjusted for self-selection (the last
two columns of Table 3). As manufacturing productivity growth accelerates relative to
services in the 1980, also when adjusting for workers’ self-selection, this figure is very
similar to Figure 8 of the main text.
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Figure 16: Transition of the model with selection-adjusted decennial productivity
growth rates
Robustness
In section 4.3 of the main text we summarized how our result change when assuming
a different underlying distribution of sectoral efficiencies and when varying the elas-
ticity of substitution between goods and services (measured in value-added terms).
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Table 8: Robustness checks: different distributions vs the data
employment share ∆ rel. avg. wage ∆
distribution corr(am, as) V ar(am) V ar(as) L M S L to M S to M
uniform 0 0.12 0.32 6.92 -16.10 9.18 12.28 14.58
lognormal 0 0.106 0.143 6.97 -17.09 10.12 5.48 5.51
0.3 0.095 0.122 7.06 -16.67 9.60 4.94 3.88
0.5 0.089 0.110 7.12 -16.35 9.23 4.59 2.90
tr. normal 0 0.143 0.229 6.93 -16.70 9.77 8.31 9.51
0.3 0.122 0.184 7.04 -16.24 9.20 7.62 7.03
0.5 0.110 0.156 7.11 -15.93 8.82 7.18 5.60
data 7.67 -19.94 12.27 13.97 21.16
Notes: The top row shows our baseline calibration of the uniform distribution, the next three rows a
lognormal distribution with different correlations between am and as, and the last three rows truncated
(at zero) normal distributions. Column 2 shows the correlation coefficient of the distribution, 3 and 4
show the variance of am and as implied by the calibration, 5 to 7 show the percentage point change in
employment shares, while the last two show the percentage change in relative average wages. The last
row contains the change in these same measures between 1960 and 2007 in the data.
Table 8 shows the model’s predictions for three calibrations of the lognormal and
the normal distribution truncated at zero for both am and as. For both class of distri-
butions the mean of am and as can be normalized to one without loss of generality.
The variance-covariance matrix of the bivariate distribution as well as τl and τs, alto-
gether 5 parameters, need to be calibrated. Since we only have 4 moments in the data
to match, we calibrate both the lognormal and the truncated normal distribution for
three different values of correlation between am and as: 0, 0.3 and 0.5. The qualitative
predictions of the model are the same for all distributions considered. The quantitative
results are virtually the same for employment shares, while the predictions for relative
average wages vary more with the distribution. As discussed in the main text, this is
driven by the differences in the correlation and calibrated variances.
In Table 9 we report the detailed results for the model’s sensitivity with respect to ε,
which we vary from the baseline value 0.002, as estimated by Herrendorf et al. (2013),
to higher values in the range of plausible values reported by Ngai and Pissarides
(2008). For each value of ε, we recalibrate the other parameters to match moments of
the 1960 data, as in section 4.1, and show the model’s predictions over 1960-2007, both
when feeding in the raw average productivity growth rates (as in the baseline simula-
tion of Figure 6) and for the selection-adjusted growth rates (as in Figure 7). Qualita-
tively the patterns of the model-implied behavior of employment shares and relative
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Table 9: Robustness checks: different model specifications vs the data
employment share ∆ relative average wage ∆
ε τl τs productivity L M S L to M S to M
0.002 0.49 0.91 raw 6.92 -16.10 9.18 12.28 14.58
0.49 0.91 adjusted 6.05 -13.97 7.92 10.60 12.38
0.02 0.49 0.91 raw 6.81 -15.77 8.97 12.03 14.21
0.49 0.91 adjusted 5.94 -13.67 7.73 10.38 12.07
0.2 0.48 0.88 raw 5.57 -12.52 6.95 9.53 10.83
0.48 0.88 adjusted 4.82 -10.79 5.97 8.19 9.21
data 7.67 -19.94 12.27 13.97 21.16
Notes: The third to fifth columns shows the percentage point change in employment shares, while the
last two columns show the percentage change in relative average wages. The first six rows contain the
implied change for different elasticities of substitutions (ε) and for raw and adjusted labor productivity
growth rates (from Table 3). The last row contains the change in these same measures between 1960 and
2007 in the data.
average wages do not change with the elasticity of substitution. Quantitatively, the
predictions naturally are affected, but even with the least favorable calibration (high ε
and labor productivity growth adjusted for selection), the model predicts a substantial
fraction of the sectoral wage and employment patterns of the last 50 years.
58
